constantpated
Apr 28 2004, 01:02 AM
Note as we deconstruct the argument that the subtle flaws in the argument generally leave the reader with a feeling of, "Uh, what was the point...?" and "How are we better off after reading this information?" This note attempts to answer these questions.
Criminal conspiracy: A reasonable possibility
One approach to investigations is to wait until the evidence is overwhelming, then making a theory. Another approach is to make a series of hypothesis, and then adjust the credibility of each hypothesis as the evidence comes in. A third approach is a mixture. And a fourth approach is to simply make theories, and find evidence that hopes to prove or disprove each theory.
One plausible solution to the entire "confusion" about 9-11 is to let the 9-11 commission issue its report, compare the recommendations with the original concerns raised, then let the public notice the gaps in the report to make annotations and further recommendations. A final stage will be to evaluate to what extent the individual players and government as a whole ignores the report, explains it away, or uses the "Gorelick is evil"-argument to dismiss conclusion.
It's a good sign that there's a cover-up when "despite all that isn't known," the leadership is already BBQ those who are daring to ask pointed questions of DOJ and other agencies that have worthless oversight from the Senate Judiciary Hearing.
Let's start with the analysis:
| QUOTE (threadbare @ Apr 27 2004, 01:50 PM) |
| Oh Maxi--I'm so sorry to hear about your brother, and for that reason I urge everyone to avoid superficial responses to the tragedy. We don't honor the memory of the victims or their families by not including criminal conspiracy of the administration as a possibility. |
Hmmm.... the above quote is interesting. Although possibly sarcastic, the quote actually sheds some light on the issues of accountability, responsiveness of the intelligence-law enforcement in a democracy.
One of the "lessons" of the Watergate era was the danger of including both the intelligence and law enforcement powers under one hat. Today, it appears as though this "gap" is being used as the excuse to justify recombining that which much be recombined.
| QUOTE (threadbare @ Apr 27 2004, 01:50 PM) |
| The reason noone at the apex of Intel is being fired or resigning over 911 is they're being rewarded for a job well done. It was an intelligence success. |
Freedom is slavery. Let's consider the real cost of this "job well done."
Let's consider the debate behind the intelligence community failiure: The evidence in re 9-11 and whether the "wall" is a problem or merely a red herring. [intelligence community serves a different master; cost: constitution]
We know three things that make Gorelick's "wall" irrelevant: The President was briefed by a CIA analysts in re FBI sourced-information on 6 Aug 01, implying that no wall prevented CIA from accessing FBI information and providing that to the decision maker. [Wall didn't stop the President from getting info; cost: President gives excuses]
Second, we also know that in Mar01, CIA and FBI personnel met with VP Cheney to discuss terrorism issues. This is 6 months prior to 9-11, and indicates that despite "the wall," nothing prevented both CIA-FBI personnel to attend the same meetings and meet with senior leadership. [Wall didn't stop Cheney getting info; cost: VP gives excuses]
Third, further adding to the argument that "no wall problem exists" is the meeting Rice had with the CSG in the early summer of 2001. Rice under oath indicated that she had met with CSG and personnel using information from both CIA and FBI were in attendance. [Wall didn't stop Rice from getting info; Cost: Rice gives excuses]
I appreciate the fact that some would like to blame former DOJ personnel for creating something that contributed to 9-11. Unfortunately, "Gorelick's wall" is a red herring. It is clear that the President, Vice President, and Rice were all briefed by joint CIA-FBI information prior to 9-11; and nothing about "the wall" prevented joint FBI-CIA information from getting into the White House. [Joint FBI-CIA can penetrate the wall; Cost: President has no excuse, looking for one]
In turn, nothing about "the wall" prevented either the President, VP, or NSC Adviser from then using that joining CIA-FBI information to pose questions at either the CSG, other experts like Clarke, or directly of CIA analysts after reading PDB. In short the "problem with the wall and intelligence" isn't simply a red herring with the wall; but the failure of the leadership to act in the absence of that wall, and ask more pointed follow-up questions. [The wall didn't prevent policy maker questions; cost: Policy makes looking for a scapegoat]
Again, this is not to suggest that the leadership had perfect information; rather it simply says that "the wall" did not prevent information from joint CIA-FBI sources to get into the White House; thus, there's no merit to conclude that this "nonexistent wall" got in the way of the White House, staff, President, or advisors from asking questions. [Walls did not exist going in, or coming out; cost: Leadership desperate]
The wall is not real, it did not prevent information from getting in; whether the wall was simply in their mind, or on the side of their eyes remains a political issue. However, even if re-elected, the President, like Nixon, can still be impeached in his second term. There is no basis to argue that the President "because he is re-elected" [TBD] suddenly becomes immune to an impeachment hearing. [Impeachment risks drive promises to intelligence community; rewards and promotions for silence; see Sibel; cost: leadership looses in-house information and inputs they allegedly rely on to justify secrecy and no oversight from without, thereby becoming more isolated]
With respect to the specific quote, we do not know why no action has been taken, nor do we know for certain what happened. But we do know that the explanations provided do not match the physical evidence. [Inconsitencies 3 years out; plenty of time to get their story straight; cost: Leadership looking for more diversions]
At best the reasons for "why the theories are invalid" are based more on hoping the questions go away, and have little to do with providing credible responses to the issues raised. It is well within the scope of possibility that the original points/concerns have been ignored and we're simply dealing with non-issues. [Old tricks failed to silence the restless crowd; cost: Leadership making more imprudent promises and using more non-sense to avoid accountability]
Someone made a number of errors, and had it not been for the 9-11 families, we would have no 9-11 commission. The President didn't want one, and wanted to delay the information; then he wanted to accelerate the work so that the report would be incomplete. [Inaction continues; Cost: Recurring errors related to 9-11 continue--unresponsive to audit-findings, more lip service to real problems, requiring greater thresholds of damage before respond]
It remains the object of a grand jury investigation to determine the facts, circumstances, reasons, and basis for the President, advisers, and others for not disciplining those who were responsible for the failures; and whether the President and others were engaged in a conspiracy to both obstruct justice, and avoid detection of criminal wrong doing. [what catalyst is required; cost: ever-higher, shifting threshold to justify action]
It the interim, it is clear that there are questions of veracity among those who might investigate the facts. The FBI has so little credibility and standing, that the Secret Service has to be brought in to investigate the Senate Judiciary Committee staff accessing private memos about the Democratic Party strategy to block the judicial nominations. Indeed, it would be foolish to have FBI investigate the Judiciary Committee as DOJ doesn't oversee FBI. [fact finders prove to be ineffectual; cost: Higher levels of abuses in FBI-DOJ required to prompt OPR investigations, higher probability of poor FBI-response, service, and attention to white collar crime]
At this point, we do now know for certain how many people were specifically aware of the information which Sibel Edmonds' is aware: How many US personnel read, reviewed, and failed to act, but had a duty to act on information that was available prior to 9-11. It is clear that based on Sibel's information that she came across multiple intercepts, and was pressured to adjust her translations. [intelligence community from the same cloth; cost: No accountability, no evidence from whistleblowers, continuing criminal conspiracy continues, more time to destroy evidence]
Further, her information suggests that the President is deliberately making misleading statements about warnings when he specially states that there were no warnings about attacks on 9-11; Sibel's retort was that there were many intercepts about other dates which the President and intelligence community knew. [threats to hide information in intelligence community; cost: More fear in the community we rely on to freely think, analyze, and see creative patterns, higher probabibility of missing an issue]
Thus, the reason that Sibel is being smeared and DOJ does not want her to testify at the civil trial before the 9-11 victims-civil trial is that she can show there was information suggestion that the President and his close advisors were in a position to know, or should have known, that there was a problem, and that they failed to act. [course of conduct indicates misconduct; unclear what rewards given to intelligence community for silence; cost: more difficult to retain specialized skills]
DoJ is not acting in the interests of the country, but is simply protecting the President. This is why that at the minimum a special prosecutor and grand jury needs to be brought in; at the ultimate level, and quite reasonably, there should be serious consideration that the House Judiciary Committee simply draft articles of impeachment and call for witnesses to find the facts: Why weren't intelligence personnel fired; what were they promised in return, if anything, for remaining silent; what information did they know, pass along, and what were they told about what to expect should the aircraft hit the WTC. [many questions about what they were actually given for silence; cost: unreformed]
It appears as though the intelligence community was given a variety of stories based on their clearance. At one extreme we have the Ms Gunns who were aware of the non-US intelligence agencies openly operating in the US; Ms Gunn would have information about other departments other than MI5/6 that operation in the US, what they knew, and what associate intelligence agencies operating in the US both knew of CIA-NSA knowledge of the pre-9-11 warnings, and the extent these non-NSA-CIA intelligence services that openly operate in the US have information outside NSA-CIA control. [intelligence community was both goaded, and complicit; cost: Intelligence ignored when serves political interests, repeat of Pearl Harbor]
We can only speculate what else they know and are not coming forward with; and we can only speculate what they were promised in exchange for silence. Let us remember that Sibel alleges that the FBI/DOJ management offered her a permanent position if she kept quiet about the translation problems, and changed the information that was already available prior to 9-11. When she refused, she was threatened with jail time by FBI agents. [others who have attempted to highlight the issues have been threatened; cost: Breakdown of communication, trust, lower probability witnesses and informants come forward; continuing barriers to FBI action]
This is not "national security information," but evidence that at least one individual was promised something of value for remaining silent about allegations of misconduct; and also evidence of criminal threats and intimidation to dissuade someone from engaging in illegal conduct. [excuses to justify harassment and a coverup; cost: Misconduct continues]
Because there is no way a missile housing system can be installed by less than 3 people, the facts and circumstances related to Sibel's allegations amount to a conspiracy. By sheer numbers alone, we cannot dismiss a conspiracy; rather, by sheer volume of inconsistent statements, and ridiculous statements, the overwhelming evidence sides with the argument that others were offered significant consideration in exchange for silence. [conspiracy; cost: Laws not enforced, no accountability, US credibility problem worldwide]
Note the transition from CIA-focus to FBI-focus
The next quote is somewhat problematic. Although the issues originally related to 9-11, we take a flying leap into the world of Communism and Special Olympics. Although we might be persuaded that the following quote is sarcastic, there's also an equally compelling argument that this is simply a red herring-absurd statement designed to mock the reader by inviting them into Alice's Wonderland. We shall refrain from entering. [you're welcome]
| QUOTE (threadbare @ Apr 27 2004, 01:50 PM) |
| Riddle me this, East is Red. Even the mentally challenged in the special Olympics understand the simple dynamics of winning a race, getting to the finish line, BEATING an OPPONENT. They knock themselves out to get that gold medal. It's extremely simple. Beat the next guy to the punch, get a medal. Let me repeat. If you win, you will be rewarded. When the FBI seniority failed to act on the urgent data that was coming in from their junior officers they were not just being clumsy, they were unable to mentally construct a simple action, reaction, reward response that is well within the capabilities of the retarded. |
Error: You're mixing up the CIA and FBI. Using this analogy, the FBI agents' inaction [at home, domestically] is part of the same plot that didn't involve the CIA. But wait, the CIA isn't part of the problem because there's a wall.
Note also the above quote suffers from a couple of flaws. First, the comparison of "why Olympians act" is compared to the intelligence community. This may be a valid comparison on several points, but the writer fails to make a distinction between those points that are of relevance, and those that are outside the bounds of reason. [imprecision]
Given that it is the author's argument that is the object of discussion, and not the relevance of the absurdity, we could take two paths. First, it is take those elements of the quote that are most relevant to 9-11 and the flaws in the intelligence community, and then compare them to the perceived flaws in the previous arguments. [compare standards, requirements, performance]
This is to say that if we look at the intelligence community's perceived failure [from the perception of the community at large] and dovetail them with the reasonable expectations of system-outputs [as arbitrarily measured by response, service, statutory compliance, and results] we arrive at several conclusions about the effectiveness of the organization relate to these arbitrary criteria, and evaluate the performance along statutory, regulatory, and appraisal-related criteria. [criteria needs to be clear]
On these grounds we find the government response wanting. If we dive into the FBI MAOP, we find the senior management acting at odds with the criteria within the OPR audit findings of 2002, as briefed to Quantico. [ineffectual performance, yet public image at odds with results; unclear what success criteria they actually use]
However, another way to look at the above quote is to simply accept the analogy as it stands, and inquire into the the ability of the combined FBI-CIA efforts to "win." This is problematic. We have several issues to be determined: To what extent the policies, actions, and guidance were legal; to what extent there was an unwritten but well understood rule that policy language means something else. Recall the Andersen order to "comply with document destruction policies" was a code-phrase to destroy evidence related to an SEC investigation into Enron. [victory means hiding in plain view the obvious to achieve unlawful ends without a trace with plausible deniability]
In this case, the FBI-CIA definition of "wining" may or may not be consistent with the public's understanding of the intent of Congress. Rather, we may have drifted into Powell-Cheney Iran-Contra land of "we take all actions to protect the country, even defy the constitution and Congress." Based on the responses to date, and the inconsistent statements by Rice and Ashkroft in re White House knowledge and "the wall", it appears as though the lessons of the Iran-Contra findings are out the window. [inconsistent definitions of success: Public may define success is safety, freedom, use of rights; intelligence community may define success in terms of national security, regardless the statutes or constitutional constraints]
This is to say that just as Reagan feared an impeachment, so too is the post-9-11 White House direction and intelligence community activity related not to the advertised national security objectives of "defense," but to the political objective of "winning the election" and "protecting the president." [how far are we approaching Watergate]
In this context, the writer offers a poignant comment on the nature of post-Iran-Contra era: That despite the possibility of impeachment over war crimes and a criminal conspiracy to engage in domestic lawless actions, the White House staff although the intelligence community is now engaging in the very efforts which justified creating the wall: Domestic surveillance, government harassment of citizens, and the detention and denial of private citizens to enjoy the constitutions. ["victory objective" now justifies changing both the ends, and the means]
Thus, the issue we find ourselves is one of not knowing whose definition of "winning" we're working with. It's clear that the idea of "winning" isn't just about doing the right thing, but about defeating anyone who stands between the President and re-election, and anyone who might have information that would put anyone else behind bars. Remember, although Dean appeared before the Watergate hearings for many hours, he did not escape jail time. When they're this deep into the possibility of being held criminally liable for war crimes, their definition of winning is to destroy any check on power that exists. We've far passed that threshold. ["victory" is about winning, but what, at what cost?]
Failure to make a credible statement
The following quote is an example of a demeaning comment that is the sign of a desperate effort to avoid discussing some very serious issues related to the constitution, impeachment, war crimes, and material information related to the public's decision over who is most appropriate to have in the White House.
Rather, this quote focuses on an absurd proposition as a means to discount what is otherwise a reasonable question about the veracity and reliability of the intelligence community. Although there may be problems with the original argument, this quote shows that a sweeping accusation of "the argument doesn't add up" but provides little evidence to show how the original argument fails, nor does it go into any detail to show how the specific comments fail or do not add up. Hopefully this note will address this defect.
| QUOTE (threadbare @ Apr 27 2004, 01:50 PM) |
| Your theory doesn't hold water. It assumes that on a personal level the seniority in the intel agencies are less able than the mentally challenged, or are emotionally averse to receiving [stet] glowing accolades, rewards, etc....etc... From a very simple epistemological and psychological point of view it DOESNT ADD UP! |
Facts: 9-11 happened, and the intelligence community didn't stop it. Using the above construct, if the intelligence community is to be rewarded, then they must be "getting rewarded" for achieving the desired result: Facilitating the event that advanced the interests of the intelligence community: Either {a} Making it happen; or {b} letting it happen, or {c} doing nothing because despite all the blame, in the end the Congress would allocate funding.
Again, the above quote may be true, but it suffers from the sweeping statement of "it doesn't add up" without providing any reasonable basis for that conclusion. This is not to say the original point is valid; just that the above quote, if it were to be given any weight, would require some additional language and points to bolster what might otherwise be valid. At this juncture, we conclude in the absence of specifics that the comment requires a rework. [unspecific comments raise questions about statements]
Geography: A useful diversion when the facts fail
The next quote is an example of introducing creative diversions to imply sophistication. We need not dive into the specifics of the argument. Rather, we simply point out that the point is demeaning comment intended to personalize the situation, and does little to discuss the original points, nor does it address the substantive flaws which may or may not exist in the proposed theories. [personalize a discussion when arguments fail]
| QUOTE (threadbare @ Apr 27 2004, 01:50 PM) |
| If you proposed in Canada (with the exception of Alberta, right Hyper?) that the administration's interpretation of events was essentially true, people would think you should have your head examined. |
The immediate reaction to the above quote might be to become defensive. Rather, we only state that the standards are not universal. This is to say that lobotomies are not necessary the automatic reaction to novelty. [demeaning to divert attention from a weak argument]
Although it has come into fashion to assume that the confused DOJ-White House has some super-human ability to control the population through threats, examples, and public smear campaigns, DOJ and the White House have failed to squelch all public comment. [desperation rises]
To be clear, lobotomies and public smear campaigns, although rich in tradition in the United States since Hamilton wrote propaganda to smear the British, it does not mean that the continued use of such tactics validates the underlying principles of the society, nor does it establish the necessary link to the founding principles. [arguments fail in the Congress and debate ends; the decision--go to war]
Democracy, although ugly, does not have to remain ugly. This country chooses to engage in such discourse when it is not helpful. [debate works if it is about substance, facts; threats, an innuendo should raise the standard to believe the leadership]
Although one might suggest such practices would not occur in other countries, this misses the point. They wouldn't do that in all other countries, yet the US, despite the ample time and opportunity to show otherwise, chooses to threaten to ensure compliance with institution that on their own merit deserve no support. [threats used to silence concerns]
The notion of public debate is a good one when the participants are secure in their confidence that the fruits of free thinking will be respected. Not in this country. Rather, freedom is only acceptable when the fruits of that freedom arrive at conclusions that support what is unlawful, and obey that which should not be obeyed. [threats to silence inconvenienent conclusions]
In theory, people in democracies [except the US] are allowed to publicly disagree without having the threat of defamation or being thrown into the loony bin. Yet, we find in practice that such theories are not strongly supported; if one were to live in Iraq, and are practicing democracy and speak out against illegal wars, well the US is ready to attack you for speaking inconvenient opinions. [US message: Iraq can only have democracy if they agree with us; we do more than give lobotomies in Iraq, we kill them despite their concerns about under-representation of the minorities]
Indeed, the White House remains incapable of find those WMDs, so let's shoot the messengers who desire to talk about freedom, responsiveness, representative governments, and protection for minorities. The CPA is more concerned with "winning the public relations effort" with force than with ensuring those in Filuja are committed to supporting the constitutional transition of authority from the CPA to the Iraqis.
With respect to the above quote, a more useful comment might have gone into details related to the specific errors of the original argument, or might have raised some specific comments and issues and questions that fact finders, investigators, or the public in general could inquire. Unfortunately, we have nothing at this level. Rather that enjoy the fruits of a learned mind, we find that there are no additional comments or issues raised that raise new, novel, unique, or untested alternative theories. In short, the above quote starts off well, but is lacking in substantive details that shed additional light on the issues. We await this illumination with enthusiasm.
From the school of "Non-sense decisions discredit are sound"
The following argument has the flaw of "central planning is bad." The other flaw is the assumption that "one must personally experience something" in order to be intellectually honest. Both arguments have evidence easily available that contradict the assertion; we conclude that the following statement is merely opinion, but the practices are at odds with the assertions.
Specifically, one may be more credible as a witness, or more passionate when they do have personal experience, but personal experience doesn't mean that a Senior Executive Service officer necessarily know everything that is in the MAOP before they can evaluate the veracity of a DOJ-audit, or independently evaluate the flaws of the DOJ's Office of Professional responsibility.
| QUOTE (threadbare @ Apr 27 2004, 01:50 PM) |
| As well East, The Russians have made the great grand mistake of centralized planning issuing from the left. They've learned the hard way, but they've learned. This lends more credence to their opinion, not less. Do you think that people who have not had these experiences are better able to form an opinion? |
Let's look at the US government: That's centrally planned. Even the departments are centrally planned. DOJ-funding isn't based on a bottom-up approach, but a "here's what we're getting" and "this is what we're going to do." Central planning is what got the Supreme Court in trouble: Failing to take action when the district courts and US Attorneys were talking about problems, but there were no discussions with Congress to institute courts directed at government-corruption. [both practice, experience at odds with quote]
Indeed, the authors point isn't just that central planning is bad, but that those who have lived through the crisis are more adept at making their case. The latter proposition is also flawed. First, we find the argument of "living through the ordeal makes one more adept at arguing the case" are not necessarily more able to form an opinion when they are traumatized. Second, the quality of that opinion matters; those closest to the crisis and most traumatized may be the least credible source of an objective opinion of what happened. They may be correct about the specific facts, but they may not know the wider context of the issues. [quote unsupported]
Thus, to ask, "Do you think that people who have not had these experience are better able to form an opinion?" leaves much to speculation. For if we truly wish to understand the possibilities, we ask, "Why doesn't the author answer the question"? There is clearly a reason to doubt the "obvious" answer, other wise that which is self-evident need not be stated unless it was apparent that the obvious deserved to be re-emphasized. [unanswered question deserves author response]
The other side of the issue is, "Are those who are outside the system better able to form an opinion." This side of the issue not only considers the question of "whether one is able to form an opinion" but also to the quality of that opinion. [quote is narrow in focus]
Let us consider the nature of public debates. The separation of powers is founded on the idea that checks and balances are required; and that certain bodies, when left to their own devices, fail to be objective, and fail to have better opinions. Rather, the founding fathers sought to inject into the government a means for learned opinion in the Senate to challenge the House; and also the Congress to Challenge the President. More recently, JKF during the Cuban Missile Crisis used two teams to challenge each other when formulating approaches. [Presidential lessons not applied in later years]
One problem with the analogy of Russia is the assumption that "because someone has gone through an ordeal, they have learned." The evidence does not support this. Rather, with time memories fade; habits return; and the entrenched bureaucratic approach continues. [experience is one thing; applying it is something else; opinions are easy, the hard part is getting that opinion to affect policy; it can be done]
Take DOJ. Despite many public gaffes, the agents continue to suffer from a moral problem, poor leadership, and the quality of their oversight within the Senate Judiciary Committee is poor. The Staffers withing DOJ are up against the entrenched mentality of "The DoJ can do no wrong." [experience, opinions mean nothing witout leadership, resources, and a vision]
Rather than deal with issues, the same circle the wagon approach continues with Sibel Edmonds when DoJ promises promotions for silence; and when DoJ smears US Attorneys [Convertino] who speak out about FBI agents not being assigned to high profile terrorism cases; and publicly harassing those who know substantive details about aircraft-missile-shoot-downs in NY to keep quiet. It remains clear that despite the many lessons for DOJ, they have not learned. Thus, there's no basis to conclude that just because someone else has gone though an ordeal they will learn. The issue is whether than awareness can be translated into substantive policies, or whether the same lessons must recur to make the inaction more self-evident. [self-evident failings are not the same as policy changles]
Another example of a body "not learning despite an ordeal" might be the Iran-Contra legacy. The 1987 transgressions and subsequent investigation by Cheney have not translated into more accountable government, nor has it ensured that government policy is constitutional. Rather, it is the lesson of Iran-Contra that is the catalyst for the Intelligence community to create more fanciful tales, involve more players, and create greater ruses in order to persuade the elected officials to agree to policies that would otherwise not be supported. [small groups make dumb moves in the US]
Small gruops: Many lessons of flaws, but who will listen?
The following quote is an example of a correct assertion that is so deeply embedded in the argument, we can only speculate as to what catalyst suddenly occurred. Indeed, the right is consolidating power, yet how is this insight useful, and how are we better off? We remain unclear.
| QUOTE (threadbare @ Apr 27 2004, 01:50 PM) |
| And how about the added complicating factor that the centralization and consolidation of power is issuing from the right this time. Russians better understand what a small cabal can accomplish with the help of useful idiots, and the ideologically brainwashed. |
Interestingly, despite the previous statement that "those who live through an experience are more able to form an opinion" [relating to the flaws of central planning], the above quote now would have us believe that "despite this experience, and opinion," Russians understand the opposite: That a small group can accomplish much. [is it legal?]
This may be true, but unfortunately our constitution is based on the idea of shared power, not diffused accountability. It may be true that a small group can accomplish much just as the rules are ignored; but the rules exist, and until they are changed, those who choose to justify ignoring the rules rely only on the practice of non-enforcement to avoid accountability. [those who know may face unresponsive leaders; checks and balances should arrive at prudence, not an accusation that "the checks are inconvenient," thereby arriving at imprudent policies]
Although the Constitution may be ignored, the lesson of history: A small group can accomplish much at odds with the interests of both the minority and the majority. The legacy of the US reaction in Filuja makes this clear--the US is more concerned with "winning" [what happened to focusing on transition?].
With respect to 9-11 the many points raised about Russia do little to make headway: What happened in the US; was it a small group that planned and covered up 9-11; did the intelligence community get rewarded for inaction; was the definition of success to create a bigger ruse with less accountability. These are the types of issues that we might have enjoyed reading, but they were not given. [interesting discussion on Russia doesn't help bridge the issues on 9-11]
It is interesting that people who might differ in ideology are characterized as idiots, while those we agree with, however misguided or flawed they are in their thinking and relative compliance with ethics or statutes, are characterized as being enlightened. Such is the folly of the Emperors' New Clothes, and why Andersen chose to remain silent despite many indicators that should have been brought to the attention of the auditors. [those idiots are voters, they may be idiots, but they do vote]
With respect to the international affairs, unfortunately for the United States, despite the end of the cold war, the US doesn't necessarily say, "Well, we beat the Russians into submission, so now let's go talk to them and find out what they did that we could learn from." Rather, it's more of the "we defeated you" and "we're going to help you remove your missiles" and "would you like some more loans so you can fund your drug operations in the Baltics?" [Russia may be a catlyst for reflection, but unlawful actions continue despite divergent opinions]
Depending on the day of the week, and the relative position of the stars against the back drop of the setting sun, one man's "idiots and brainwashed" could another's "President and intelligence community." With respect to Iraq, some might suggest invoking the threat of terror or bombs in order to justify action where debate is needed. There is a law against terrorism. This President uses terrorism to mobilize Congress and responds by saying, "Look how little was done." Indeed, little was done because the "idiots and brainwashed" have a Bill of Rights and use a system of checks and balances to impeach. Without impeachment, the "idiots and brainwashed" have become Presidential Saints. Onward Christian soldier, to Damascus. [we may have more efficient decisions, but are those decisions, regardless legality, taking us to prudent outcomes? I think not.]
From the "let's see who is being more loony-school"
The final quote in the deconstruction is noteworthy for 6 counts. First it suffers from the either-or fallacy; second it incorrectly describes peasants as czarists [they were peasants, the czars were not]; third it implies that the peasants accepted communism [they did not, the intellectuals had to actively motivate the country, and change required a revolution not a simple acceptance; fourth, the issue of transparency is described as being a theory [it's called the law, full disclosure, open skies]; fifth it unreasonably characterizes a founding principle of the American Constitution as being associated with "fluffy pillows" so as to deride the principles and raise unreasonable questions about the merits of accountability, oversight, and rule of law; and Sixth, does little to persuade the audience that the substantive issues raised in the original post have been adequately addressed. [The quote deserves to be ignored, by why stop]
| QUOTE (threadbare @ Apr 27 2004, 01:50 PM) |
| As far as being susceptible to any loony theory, what is more foolish, a starving czarist peasant accepting communism because it offers him a way out of his dire circumstances, or a butt-lazy intellectual who falls for transparency theory because it provides a soft fluffy pillow to rest his/her head? A cozy refuge from the truth, an escape from the unsettling experience of exposing the mind to anything that might change it. |
Comments: What might have been interesting to read
The reader might have been more persuaded had the following occurred.
1. Outline specific solutions to the flawed theories related to 9-11. The author has not done this. On the other hand, others have reasonably discussed the flaws of the theories and it appears the discussions quickly break down into, "That's a dumb idea" vs "The theory remains valid, and unchallenged, and the available evidence supports continued investigation."
2. Identify the inconsistent statements in the theories, and provide links to evidence that shows there is a conspiracy among "the conspiracy theorists." The author fails to provide this information. Opponents have provided links, photos, questions, and raised issues. The proponents of the "9-11 was a conspiracy of conspiracy theorists" have yet to provide a clean story. The burden rests with the government that rallied the nation for war; their track record with WMD indicates their arguments are based on wishes not facts. Such is not the basis for prudent policy, only more mindlessness.
3. Provide evidence by way of analogy, anecdotes, or publicly available documents to show that the nation had learned, heeded the lessons of 9-11. The author makes an interesting discussion of the general concerns with the original post, but fails to go into any detailed discussion of the problems with the proposed theories; nor does the author provide any substantive evidence to justify faith and confidence in their version of events. On this point, the proponents of the theories suggesting government complicity and cover-up have more weight both in evidence, volume, and consistency. The opponents of the theories suffer from the same faulty logic upon which the nation launched an illegal war in Iraq.
4. Demonstrate that the intelligence community was aware of their error, and had a firm position on what they knew, what they missed, or whether the response was simply a deliberate effort to do nothing to justify mobilizing for war. At this juncture we are not clear what the position is of the intelligence community; nor does the author speculate or define this, nor has the author provided that insight.
Although we recognize that the intelligence community has talent, it remains unclear to what extent the failures were related to deliberate obstruction of information, inaction, or pure problems. Most undermining the intelligence community's assertions that "they did their best" was the inexplicable reaction to multiple overseas reports indicating problems; and the direct evidence that Rice, Cheney, and the President were aware of details indicating they were aware of specific information to inquire into hijackings and possible attempts to collide aircraft in Genoa, Italy. President Bush requested PDB06Aug01 because of the threat of Genoa; this concern is related to detailed information that Sibel Edmonds has corroborated.
Thus, to suggest that the intelligence community has done the right thing, or done their job misses the point: Nobody stopped them from resigning, and nobody stopped them from using alternative communications systems though the IG or Congress to alert the intelligence community and intelligence committee of information related to planning activity related to the attacks. Rather, despite all that was known, it remains clear that many knew in advance, but chose to do nothing because they were promised "the buildings would not fall down" or "it's in the interests of the country" or "this is the time to be a good soldier."
Summary
The above discussion is by no means intended to be exhaustive. Rather, this is only the tip of the iceberg on the proverbial "who's got a better case." I would hope that the author consider the comments in the spirit that they are intended: To provide specific examples of where the argument might be improved.
Although 9-11 remains a topic of debate, question, uncertainty, and a source of international angst, I remain confident that despite 9-11, the country requires that catalyst of another disaster to awaken it to the rude reality upon which we find ourselves: That the country on 9-11 transformed itself into a democratic-despotism, has no intention of listening to the truth, and plans to go out of its way to embrace the needed reforms in DoJ, DoD, and the Judicial Branch of Government.
What is a shame is that despite many within the various branches of government who knew of information, most but for a handful [Sibel Edmonds, Convertino, and a few in the FBI] have chosen to remain silent.
There is no way a missile-housing-system could be created but for at least 42 people. I see no evidence that 42 people who created this aircraft modification system are coming forward.
There is no way that aircraft commanders could be trained at Navy Bases in Florida, unless commanders were aware of their presence. I see no effort to discipline DOJ or the FBI for their harassment of those who saw the training.
Whatever happened prior to 9-11 can be understood. Whether the intelligence community chooses to freely admit what it has done, or failed to do; or requires the catalyst of a grand jury and war crimes-impeachment hearing remains to be seen. What is known, is that the issue of 9-11 is not simply one of who knew what and failed to act; but why has so much been able to go so wrong, and so few are willing to discuss reality.
Until reality sinks in, rest assured that the next time this country's leadership is faced with a seemingly impossible post-Asian Financial Crisis-like bubble, they will do much to deny reality, then admit they've lost time to solve the problem. What happened on 9-11 was a failure of the country's leadership to solve post-financial-collapses in their infancy, and when it becomes self-evident the US was about to slide into an economic black hole, the agreed-to=solution was to attack ourselves.
Economic cycles are not new. Going forward, unless the country credible establishes mechanisms to identify and mitigate the risks of transnational economic disasters, the adverse impacts of economic cycles may once again be only "solvable" by mobilizing for war. That may be reality, but let us not talk of freedom, lessons of history, and the evidence of superior Americana when the only solution to our problems is war. That may be reality, but it is the same rubber stamp reality that mobilized the Romans to rally for war once too often.
War is easy. The hard bard is cleaning up. This country may choose to mobilize for war once again to avoid the hard questions about 9-11, who was responsible, and what else we haven't been told. Until we have those answers, rests assured the same arrogant leaders who ran out of options and marched this nation to war, are getting their drums ready for more marching. War is their only solution.
We do little to credibly educate our country when we say one thing in school, and the real-life requirements are at odds with those standards. The world resents a great power that prides itself on free markets and freedom, but uses war to impose its will on others because the excesses of free markets display the self evident failings of leaders who do what is in their self-interests, not prudent. Such is not the legacy of the founding fathers, and why this leadership knows that a populace that recognizes this inconsistency stands as not just a challenge to the Presidency but to the real possibility they might be held criminally liable through war crimes tribunals and impeachment hearings.
If re-elected, President Bush may not use his re-election has the verbal armor to scrutiny; he will try, but Nixon showed that the law, although slow to awaken to threats to the constitution, can be mobilized. It remains to be seen whether this President will destroy the constitution to save himself. There is nothing stopping him but an informed population who might remove him lawfully from power, or mobilize to have an impeachment hearing and war crimes tribunal. The summer has not started.
The heat of Iraq will be a reminder why we moved in the Spring of 2003. Hot, dry Iraqis may have little patience when the US chooses to "win abroad" and the power plants remain unreparied. The real possibilty of a civil war in Iraq is, sadly, the President's welcome distraction from what remains unanswered at home in re 9-11.
Flawed planning system has not planned for a civil war. The pre-Iraq-invasion preparations have shown how much a flawed policy will gain moementum, regardless the planning requirements. Occuption-era-Iraq shows the US will move regardless the ability to suport what are flawed plans. Using pre-invasion planning in re Iraq-occuption as a guide, the White House has not seriously considered, nor adequately planned for, the possibilty that the US may be on the other side of the civil war. To Damascus!