Finally, some respected money managers are calling this what it is THEFT.
March 24, 2008
Why is Bear Stearns Trading at $6 Instead of $2?
John P. Hussman, Ph.D.
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Well, the ECRI (one of the more reliable private economic analysis groups) has finally thrown in the towel – “With the Weekly Leading Index having dropped more than 13 points in the last nine months, it is exhibiting a pronounced, pervasive, and persistent decline that is unambiguously recessionary.”
The possibility of a “bear market rally” aside, if the S&P 500 has already set its low, it will have been the first time that the market has responded to a similar economic downturn with less than a 20% loss on a closing basis. If we define the recent downturn as a bear market anyway, the recent low will represent the highest level of valuation that has ever prevailed at the bottom of a bear market. I expect neither of these to be true for long, but as usual, we'll respond to the evidence as it unfolds – without the need to forecast any particular scenario.
Though our investment horizon of interest is a complete market cycle, we don't generally think in terms of bull and bear markets, because they can only be determined in hindsight. We prefer observable measures that allow us to identify the prevailing state or “Market Climate” at every point in time. We don't expect various Market Climates to overlap tightly with actual bull or bear markets. Instead, we expect that, on average, the return/risk profile in “favorable” Market Climates will significantly exceed the return/risk profile in “unfavorable” Market Climates. Accordingly, if we accept a greater amount of risk during favorable conditions, and less during unfavorable conditions, we expect to perform strongly – at controlled risk – over the complete market cycle.
For now, we remain defensive, but we recognize the potential for a “bear market rally” despite conditions that, as yet, do not provide enough evidence to warrant removing a significant portion of our hedges.
Why is Bear Stearns trading at $6 instead of $2?
As I emphasized last week, the large “term financing” and “term securities lending” programs initiated by the Fed do not expose the Fed to default risk in mortgage collateral it accepts from the banks that act as primary dealers. Even if the underlying securities default, those facilities involve repurchase agreements, so the bank putting up the collateral has to repurchase the collateral at the original price plus interest after a term of 28 or 90 days. The Fed only stands to lose if the bank itself fails, and so spectacularly that the bank's liquidation value goes negative even after zeroing out bondholder claims and stockholder equity. Even in the present environment, this is unlikely.
Alarmingly, immediately after the pixels dried on last week's comment (noting “the Fed is emphatically not taking the default risk of the mortgage market onto itself” with these term facilities), details emerged that the Fed had agreed to a very different deal in its attempt to rescue Bear Stearns. This is a major and ominous departure from historical Fed policy, and from legality.
I'll cut straight to the chase.
Bear Stearns is trading at $6 instead of $2 because unelected bureaucrats went beyond their legal mandates, delivered a windfall to a single private company at public expense, entered agreements that violate the the public trust, and created a situation where even if the bureaucratic malfeasance stands, the shareholders of Bear Stearns will either reject the deal or be deprived of their right to determine the fate of the company they own. Very simply, Bear Stearns is still in play. Still, when all is said and done, my own impression is that the ultimate value of the stock will not be $2, but exactly zero.
In effect, the Federal Reserve decided last week to overstep its legal boundaries – going beyond providing liquidity to the banking system and attempting to ensure the solvency of a non-bank entity. Specifically, the Fed agreed to provide a $30 billion “non-recourse loan” to J.P. Morgan, secured only by the worst tranche of Bear Stearns' mortgage debt. But the bank – J.P. Morgan – was in no financial trouble. Instead, it was effectively offered a subsidy by the Fed at public expense. Rick Santelli of Crapvision is exactly right. If this is how the U.S. government is going to operate in a democratic, free-market society, “we might as well put a hammer and sickle on the flag.”
What is a “non-recourse loan”? Put simply, if the homeowners underlying that weak tranche of debt go into foreclosure, they will lose their homes, and the public will lose as well. But J.P. Morgan will not lose, nor will Bear Stearns' bondholders. This will be an outrageous outcome if it is allowed to stand.
In my view, the deal would be palatable if J.P. Morgan was to remain fully responsible for any losses on the “collateral” provided to the Federal Reserve, assuming shareholders were to consent to the buyout. As it stands, Congress should quickly step in to bust the existing deal and demand an alternate resolution, by clearly insisting that the Fed's action was not legal.
The Fed did not act to save a bank, but to enrich one. Congress has the power to appropriate resources for such a deal by the representative will of the people – the Fed does not, even under Depression era banking laws. The “loan” falls outside of Section 13-3 of the Federal Reserve Act, because it is not in fact a loan to either Bear Stearns or J.P. Morgan. Bear Stearns is no longer a business entity under this agreement. And if the fiction that this is a “loan” to J.P. Morgan was true, J.P. Morgan would be obligated to pay it back, period. The only point at which the value of the “collateral” would become an issue would be in the event that J.P. Morgan itself was to fail. No, this is not a loan. It is a put option granted by the Fed to J.P. Morgan on a basket of toxic securities. And it is not legal
http://www.hussman.net/wmc/wmc080324.htm